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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Article VIII § 5 
of the Utah Constitution, Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) and (4), Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2(a)-3(2)(j), and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The appeal in this case 
was taken from the entering of a no-cause of action against Plaintiff-Appellant after a jury 
trial on August 12, 2005, before the Honorable John Paul Kennedy. The case was 
appealed to the Utah Supreme Court and subsequently transferred to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
The issues presented for appeal, as stated by Appellant, are as follows: 
1. The Court erred when it gave instructions to the jury to determine the law of a 
citizen's arrest. 
Standard of Review: Review for correctness. See Green v. Louden 2001 UT 62 
PI4, 29 P.3d 638 (holding that review of challenges to jury instructions are under a 
"correctness" standard). 
2. The Court's jury instructions to determine the facts of a citizen's arrest were in 
error. 
Standard of Review: Review for correctness. See Green v. Louder. 2001 UT 62 
P14, 29 P.3d 638 (holding that review of challenges to jury instructions are under a 
"correctness" standard). 
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3. The Court erred when it ordered Appellant to pay the Appellee's court costs. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. See Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81 
P140, 130 P.3d 325 (holding that the trial court's decision to award costs under 
Rule 54(d)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard). 
4. The Court erred when it denied the Appellant damages awarded to him by the jury. 
Standard of Review: Appellant's argument on its fourth point on appeal appears to 
claim that the statute upon which the jury instruction regarding Appellee having a 
lawful right to detain Appellant is unconstitutional. Accordingly, it appears that 
the Appellant is challenging both the instruction and the constitutionality of the 
underlying statute. Both issues are issues of law which are reviewed for 
correctness. See Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62 P14, 29 P.3d 638 (holding that 
review of challenges to jury instructions are under a "correctness" standard); and 
State v. Thomas. 2002 UT 128 P4, 63 P.3d 672 (holding that conclusions of law of 
a district court are reviewed for correctness). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The following statutes and rules are set out verbatim in the addendum attached 
hereto: 
Utah Code Ann. §78-11-18 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
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Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Rule 40 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves the claim of Lynn Jenkins ("Appellant") for false imprisonment 
as the result of being detained by employees of National Product Sales ("Appellee"), after 
returning to Appellee's store after removing a truck bumper from the store and taking it to 
Bountiful. Appellant alleged at trial that he had permission to take the merchandise with 
him to Bountiful, while Appellee alleged that Appellant had only been given permission 
to take the bumper to the store parking lot to check it for fit. A jury trial was held on 
August 12, 2005, in which the jury entered a no-cause verdict based on a finding that 
Appellee's actions were within the scope of limited immunity for merchants as outlined in 
Utah Code Ann. §78-11-18. This appeal followed. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
Appellant has not provided a statement of relevant facts, or any citations to the 
record to support any such facts. The only references to material that would appear in the 
record are references to portions of the Verdict Form. The Verdict Form is in the record 
at pages 250 - 253. As Appellant has not provided a statement of relevant facts or made 
any other attempt to marshal the facts in support of his issues on appeal, it must be 
3 
assumed that the jury's findings were adequately supported by evidence at trial. See 
Harding v. Bell 2002 UT 108 P19, 57 P.3d 1093. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellee contends as a preliminary matter that Appellant's Issues Nos. 1,3, and 4 
fail as a matter of law on appeal as Appellant has failed to adequately brief these issues. 
Appellant has made bald citations to cases on these points without attempting to analyze 
or otherwise explain the relevance of the cases, or to make any meaningful analysis of 
these issues and the alleged errors of the trial court. In fact, with respect to Issue No. 1, it 
is not even clear what Appellant's issue on appeal really is. 
With respect to Appellant's Issue No. 1, Appellee further contends that as the law 
of citizen's arrest was not the basis for the jury's entry of a no-cause verdict against 
Appellant, then any mistake as to the law of citizen's arrest was harmless error by the 
Court. 
With respect to Appellant Issue No. 2, Appellee contends that there was no error in 
the jury instructions regarding citizen's arrest as the jury instructions include the very 
requirements that Appellant claims are lacking. Appellee also contends that as citizen's 
arrest was not the basis for the no-cause verdict against Appellant, that any error that may 
have occurred is harmless. 
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With respect to Appellant Issue No. 3, Appellee contends that pursuant to Rule 
54(d)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Appellee was entitled to an award of costs 
as the prevailing party. 
With respect to Appellant Issue No. 4, Appellee further contends that Utah Code 
Ann. §78-11-18 is not unconstitutional as it does not abrogate an existing cause of action, 
and even if it did, it is constitutional as it is a reasonable means of eliminating a clear 
social and economic evil. 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANT'S FIRST POINT ON APPEAL FAILS BECAUSE 
APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO PROPERLY BRIEF THE ISSUE AND 
BECAUSE THE LAW OF CITIZEN'S ARREST WAS NOT THE BASIS 
FOR THE ENTRY OF A NO-CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST 
APPELLANT. 
Appellant's first issue on appeal is that "the court clearly erred when it gave 
instructions to the jury to determine the law of a citizen's arrest." Appellant's Brief, page 
5. Appellant's Brief on this point is deficient under Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure and should not be considered. Appellant's entire argument on this 
issue is as follows: 
Standard of Review: State v. Trane. 2002 Utah Lexis 138,*; 2002 UT 97; 
57 P.2d 1052, [*12] "The actual issue in this case is whether the [NPS] 
officers had authority and probable cause to arrest [plaintiff]." See 
Appellant's Brief, page 1. 
and 
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As to Issue: I , the court clearly erred when it gave instructions to the jury to 
determine the law of a citizen's arrest. Determinative law: The Supreme 
Court has stated an arrest is an issue of law. See: State v. Trane, 2002 Utah 
LEXIS 138,*; 2002 UT 97; 57 P.3d 1052, "Further, the questions of 
whether an arrest... is constitutional are questions of law .... State v. 
Harmon., 910 P.2d 1196, 1199; State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 
1992)." See Appellant's Brief, page 5. 
This argument fails to even properly identify how the trial court allowed the jury to 
determine the law of citizen's arrest or even which instructions purportedly allow the jury 
to determine the law of citizen's arrest. It is also not clear how this point on appeal is 
distinguishable from Appellant's second point on appeal which claims that the 
instructions to determine the facts of citizen's arrest were in error. Further, Appellant has 
not provided any meaningful analysis or development of the cited authority to explain 
how citations from cases dealing with criminal convictions have any bearing in a civil suit 
for false imprisonment. Absent development and reasoned analysis of the cited authority, 
this issue has not been adequately briefed. See Spencer v. Pleasant View City, 2003 UT 
App379P20,80P.3d546. 
Most importantly, any alleged error on this point is harmless. A proper citizen's 
arrest is a defense to a claim for false imprisonment. See McFarland v. Skaggs Cos., 678 
P.2d 298, 300-303 (Utah 1984) (analyzing the authority to make a citizen's arrest as a 
defense to a false imprisonment claim). The jury found that Appellant was intentionally 
detained by the Appellee without Appellant's consent. See Verdict Form, page 1, R.250. 
The jury also found that Appellant was aware of the detention or was damaged by the 
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detention. See Verdict Form, page 1,R.250. Accordingly, Appellant had established his 
prima facie case for false imprisonment and cannot contend that he was prevented from 
establishing his prima facie case because of any improper instruction. See Watters v. 
Querry, 626 P.2d 455, 459 (Utah 1981) (holding that "no flaw in the court's instructions 
relating to negligence can inure to the plaintiffs detriment" because the jury had found in 
the plaintiffs favor on this issue, but dismissed on the issue of causation). 
The jury subsequently found that the Appellee had the lawful right to detain the 
Appellant. See Verdict Form, pages 1-2, R.250-251. However, this finding was not 
based on the citizen's arrest privilege, but on the merchant's authority to detain under 
Utah Code Ann. §78-11-18. Under Utah law, it is harmless error to give an improper jury 
instruction if a jury could have reached a no-cause verdict on alternate theories and the 
jury did not identify which theory it relied upon in reaching a no-cause verdict. See 
Butler v. Naylor. 1999 UT 85 P21, 987 P.2d 41 (holding harmless error to give improper 
jury instruction if jury could have reached no-cause verdict on alternate theories presented 
by defense, where jury did not identify theory relied upon in the verdict). In the instant 
case, the jury specifically found the Appellee's conduct to be lawful under the merchant's 
authority to detain outlined in Utah Code Ann. §78-11-18, not under the theory of a 
proper citizen's arrest. Therefore, any improper instruction regarding the law of citizen's 
arrest was harmless error because it was not the basis for the jury's decision. 
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II. APPELLANT'S SECOND POINT ON APPEAL FAILS BECAUSE THE 
COURT'S JURY INSTRUCTION REGARDING CITIZEN'S ARREST 
WAS PROPER AND BECAUSE ANY ERROR IN THE INSTRUCTION 
WAS HARMLESS. 
Appellant states as his second issue on appeal that the "court's jury instructions to 
determine the facts of the citizen's arrest were in error." See Appellate Brief, page 6. In 
his Statement of the Issues Presented for Review, Appellant apparently contends that it 
was Paragraph 3 of the Verdict Form that was in error.1 However, Paragraph 3 of the 
Verdict Form is not the instruction regarding the law of citizen's arrest. Rather, it is 
Paragraph 4 of the Verdict Form which contains the instruction regarding the law of 
citizen's arrest. 
Appellant correctly notes that for a citizen's arrest to be lawful, the person making 
the arrest must be given notice at the time of the detention or arrest of the arresting 
person's intention, cause and authority to make the arrest. See Appellate's Brief, page 6. 
However, Appellant fails to recognize that this precise instruction was given in Paragraph 
4 of the Verdict Form, and as part of Instruction No. 31. Paragraph 4 of the Verdict Form 
and of Jury Instruction No. 31 reads: 
1
 The substance of the Verdict Form was also included in the jury instructions as 
Instruction No. 31. It should be noted that a typographical error resulted in two Paragraphs being 
identified as paragraph "3", with the first paragraph of these two paragraphs being renumbered 
by the Court as Paragraph 2(a) when the jury requested a clarification on this issue. See 
Transcript of Trial, R.312 (page 234 of the transcript). It appears that the jury did not actually 
correct the typographical error. It is the first Paragraph 3, which should be renumbered as 2(a) 
which Appellant refers to in his Statement of Issues Presented for Review. 
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If you find that the Defendant or its employees performed a "citizens' 
arrest", then do you also find that the Defendant or its employees and/or 
agents provided notice to the Plaintiff at the time of the detention of his 
intention to detain Plaintiff, the cause of the detention, and the person's 
authority to make the detention. 
See Paragraph 4 of Instruction 31, R.281 and Paragraph 4 of Verdict Form, R.252. 
Accordingly, there is no error in the jury instructions because the jury instruction 
Appellant claims should have been included, was in fact, included in the jury instructions 
and verdict form. See Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande W.R.R.. 2001 UT 77 PP38 and 
41, 31 P.3d 557 (holding no error where requested jury instruction was properly covered 
in other jury instructions). 
Further, even if Paragraph 4 was not a proper statement of the law, the error is 
harmless. Utah courts "will not reverse for errors injury instructions if the complaining 
party 'fails to demonstrate how the court's refusal to adopt their proposed jury 
instructions prejudiced them." Cheves v. Williams. 1999 UT 86 P37, 993 P.2d 191 
(citing Walker Drug Co. V. La Sal Oil Co.. 972 P.2d 1238, 1249 (Utah 1998)). In the 
instant case, Appellant has failed to indicate how he has been prejudiced by any alleged 
deficiency regarding the instructions on citizen's arrest at trial. As discussed in Section I 
supra. Appellant established his prima facie case for false imprisonment, meaning that 
any error in the instructions regarding citizen's arrest did not prevent him from 
establishing his case. The jury returned a no-cause verdict specifically based on 
merchant's immunity under Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-18, not the citizen's arrest privilege. 
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Accordingly, even if the jury instructions on citizen's arrest were in error, Appellant has 
not been prejudiced by any such error. 
III. APPELLANT'S THIRD POINT ON APPEAL FAILS BECAUSE THE 
COURT PROPERLY ORDERED THE APPELLANT TO PAY 
APPELLEE'S COSTS AS APPELLEE WAS THE PREVAILING PARTY 
AT TRIAL. 
As a preliminary matter, Appellant has failed to properly brief this issue and this 
point should be disregarded on appeal. Appellant's entire argument on this issue consists 
of two quotes from the decision in Eddy v. Albertson's. Inc.. 2001 UT 88, 34 P.3d 781, 
into which Appellant has inserted "NPS", "Appellee" and "Appellant" in place of the 
names of the parties in that case. 
In his Statement of the Issues Presented for Review, Appellant quotes the Eddy 
decision as follows: 
The jury was justified in concluding that the [NPS] employees detained 
[appellant] on suspicion of shoplifting and that they failed to satisfy the 
citizen's arrest statutory requirements. While there was other evidence 
supportive of [appellee's] version of events, the jury was entitled to make 
its own judgments on controverted testimony regarding the facts. 
See Appellant's Brief, pages 2 and 3 (citing Eddy at P16). In his Argument section on 
this point, Appellant again quotes Eddy as follows: 
The jury found that [NPS had] falsely imprisoned [appellant], but did not 
find intentional infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, the jury 
awarded $5616 in damages and costs. 
See Appellant's Brief, page 6 (citing Eddy at P8). This argument fails to comply with the 
requirements of Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate procedure as outlined in Spencer, 
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supra. Appellant has failed to provide any meaningful analysis of this issue and has failed 
to provide any analysis or reasoning regarding his citations to legal authority. It is not a 
proper argument to insert the current party's names into quotes from prior decisions. 
Further, the Eddy decision is not on point on this issue. Eddy was an appeal from 
a denial of the defendant's motion for a directed verdict after a jury found in favor of the 
plaintiff in a false imprisonment case. Id. at P8. As a prevailing party, the plaintiff in that 
case would be entitled to damages and costs. In the instant case, the opposite situation is 
presented. Appellant was not the prevailing party at trial because the jury entered a no-
cause verdict. Accordingly, the Appellee is the prevailing party at trial and is entitled to 
its costs pursuant to Rule 54(d)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Appellant has 
not provided any citation to law or facts, or any analysis of any such citation, to explain 
how the trial court abused its discretion in awarding costs to Appellee. 
IV. APPELLANT'S FOURTH POINT ON APPEAL FAILS BECAUSE 
APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO ADEQUATELY BRIEF THE ISSUE AND 
BECAUSE THE COURT WAS CORRECT TO NOT AWARD DAMAGES 
TO APPELLANT. 
Appellant has failed to properly brief his claim that the court erred by not awarding 
damages as found by the jury. Appellant's argument begins with another citation from 
the Eddy decision, supra, into which Appellant again inserts the current parties' names 
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into a statement containing factual determinations from the Eddy decision, rather than the 
current decision. Appellant states: 
Based on th[e] evidence, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that the 
two [appellee's] employees were acting on suspicion of shoplifting, and that 
under the circumstances the suspicion was unfounded and could not give 
rise to a right to arrest and detain. 
See Appellant's Brief, page 7 (citing Eddy at PI 1). Whatever was reasonable for the jury 
to conclude in the Eddy decision, based on the evidence presented in that case, has no 
bearing on the current matter before the Court. The Eddy decision does not, in any way, 
indicate that Appellee in the instant case did not have a right to detain the Appellant. 
Appellant has not provided any argument or analysis to explain how Eddy in anyway is 
relevant to the issue of whether Appellant was entitled to prevail at trial in his own case. 
The only other argument in support of Appellant's fourth claim of error consists of 
citations to the decisions of Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, 57 P.3d 1007 (citing 
Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.. 517 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) and Gallivan v. Walker. 2002 
UT 89, 54 P.3d 1069, regarding various provisions of the Utah Constitution, and an 
assertion that "appellee's immunity, granted by the jury, failed to meet the immunity 
standard established by the Laney decision and equal protection requirements outlined in 
Gallivan. See Appellant's Brief, pages 7-8. Appellant is apparently asking this Court to 
declare at Utah Code Ann. §78-11-18 unconstitutional. 
Under the decision of State v. Thomas. 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998), the 
Supreme Court noted that the "court is not a depository in which the appealing party may 
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dump the burden of argument and research." (Internal citations omitted). However, 
Appellant has failed to identify the test outlined in Laney to evaluate the statute and has 
failed to provide any analysis of the equal protection requirements the statute is claimed 
to violate. Appellant is merely throwing an issue before the Court and forcing the Court 
to argue and research the issue on his behalf. Such assertions fail to comply with the 
briefing requirements under Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
particularly where the question is one of constitutional analysis. 
Further, §78-11-18 does meet the standard in Laney, as taken from the decision in 
Berry. The Laney decision requires that a preliminary determination that a cause of 
action has been abrogated by statute. Id. at P49. If a cause of action has been abrogated, 
Laney then outlines a two-pronged analysis to determine whether the statute provides 
either a reasonable alternate remedy or eliminates a clear social or economic evil and that 
the elimination of the existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means for 
achieving the objective. Id. at PP 54-55. 
Section 78-11-18 does not abrogate a cause of action, but rather provides an 
affirmative defense, in the event that the merchant is able to prove the necessary elements 
of the defense. The fact that an affirmative defense is codified or created does not 
abrogate a cause of action. This is particularly true where the affirmative defense relied 
upon requires that the merchant's actions be reasonable. A merchant can still be liable for 
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false arrest if a jury determines the merchant's actions do not meet the requirements of 
§78-11-18. 
Even if §78-11-18 abrogates an existing legal remedy, §78-11-18 would still be 
constitutional under the second prong of the Laney test, as the legislature has acted to 
eliminate a clear social or economic evil. The Utah Supreme Court, as part of a 
discussion regarding the imposition of punitive damages in shoplifting cases, has noted 
that: 
The very real problem of shoplifting pits two important considerations 
against each other—the right of the merchant to protect his inventory and the 
right of the citizen to be free from unwarranted detention and accusation. 
The common law rule of strict tort liability protected the patron, but at the 
expense of the merchants property interest. On the other hand, absolute 
immunity for the merchant would go too far in allowing one private citizen 
the right to detain, search and question another. 
McFarland at 304. Shoplifting is a significant problem in modern society. Shoplifting 
results in increased costs to both merchants and consumers. In order to allow merchants 
to better protect their inventory, the Legislature granted an affirmative defense to false 
arrest claims by §78-11-18. The statute is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means to meet 
the objective. Claims against merchants for detentions are not barred completely; rather, 
the merchant is given an affirmative defense, upon which the merchant bears the burden 
of proof at trial, that grants immunity to suit if the merchant's actions are reasonable and 
otherwise comply with §78-11-18. As a result, in the majority of cases, there will be 
issues of fad to be presented to a jury. Injured parties will have an opportunity to have 
14 
their case heard, and a jury will determine whether the merchant acted in a reasonable 
fashion. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's Issues Nos. 1, 3, and 4 on appeal fail because Appellant has failed to 
adequately brief these issues so as to allow the Court to conduct a meaningful review of 
the alleged errors. Further, Issue No. 1 fails because the no-cause verdict was not based 
on the law of citizen's arrest, rendering any possible error on that issue harmless. Issue 
No. 2 also fails because the no-cause verdict was not based on the law of citizen's arrest, 
making any possible error harmless, and because the purported errors claimed in Issue 
No. 2 were covered in other jury instructions. Issue No. 3, in addition to being 
inadequately briefed, fails because Appellee was the prevailing party on appeal, and 
Appellant has not provided any reason why the trial court's discretion on the imposition 
of costs should be overturned. Finally, Issue No. 4, in addition to being inadequately 
briefed, fails because §78-11-18 does not abrogate an existing legal remedy, and even if it 
did, it is constitutional under the second prong of the test outlined in Laney as eliminating 
a clear social and economic evil, with the elimination of the remedy not being arbitrary or 
unreasonable. 
Based on a review of Appellant's brief, Appellee contends that such appeal is 
frivolous as it is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, and cannot be said to 
be based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. Pursuant to 
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O'Brien v.Rush. 744 P.2d 306, 310 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), a frivolous appeal is defined as 
"having no reasonable legal or factual basis as defined in Rule 40(a) [of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure]", but does not require an examination of the issue of good faith. On 
at least three of Appellant's four issues on appeal, Appellant has failed to adequately brief 
the issues, and the briefing on the remaining issue is cursory at best. The majority of the 
cases cited by Appellant have no bearing on the issues on appeal, and Appellant fails to 
provide any analysis of cases that are arguably relevant. Accordingly, Appellee asks that 
the judgment entered by the trial court be affirmed in all respects; that Appellee be 
granted damages on appeal pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
for a frivolous appeal; and that Appellee be granted costs on appeal pursuant to Rule 34 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
DATED this ^ ^ day of May, 2006. 
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
TERRY M. PLANT 
ANDREW M. WADSWORTH 
Attorneys for Defendant National Product Sales 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LYNN A. JENKINS, I., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NATIONAL PRODUCT SALES, 
INC., 
Defendant. 
VERDICT 
Third Judicial District 
AUG 12 2005 
SALT I 
By. 
Case No. 010911737 
Judge John Paul Kennedy 
DiptyOimk 
We, at least six of the Jurors in the above case, find as follows: 
1. Plaintiff was detained by Defendant or its employees or agents who acted 
intentionally and without Plaintiffs consent. 
Yes X 
No 
Plaintiff was aware of the detention or was damaged by the detention. 
Yes )( 
No 
3. Defendant, or its employees or agents, had the lawful right to detain the Plaintiff 
because: 
a. The Defendant, and or its employee or agent, had reason to believe that 
merchandise had been wrongfully taken by the Plaintiff, and the 
merchandise can be recovered by detaining the Plaintiff in a reasonable 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
manner for a reasonable length of time, for the purpose of attempting to 
effect the recovery of the merchandise or for the purpose of informing a 
peace officer of the circumstances of the detention. 
X 
The Defendant, and or its employee or agent, had probable cause to 
believe that Plaintiff had committed a retail theft or had taken the goods 
with an intent to steal them, if the detention is for a reasonable length of 
time for all or any of the following purposes: to recover the goods, or to 
make reasonable inquiry as to whether Plaintiff has in his possession 
unpurchased merchandise; to request and/or verify identification. 
X 
to inform a peace officer of the detention of the person and surrender that 
person to the custody of a peace officer. 
X 
9 
~K 
3. Did Defendant show by a preponderance of the evidence that the person causing 
the detention of the Plaintiff had probable cause to believe that Plaintiff had 
committed retail theft and that the Defendant and its employees and agents acted 
reasonably in detaining Plaintiff under all circumstances of this case. 
Yes 
No 
4. If you find that the Defendant or its employees performed a "citizens' arrest", then 
do you also find that the Defendant or its employees and/or agents provided notice 
to the Plaintiff at the time of the detention of his intention to detain Plaintiff, the 
cause of the detention, and the person's authority to make the detention. 
Yes X 
No 
5. If you find that the Defendant or its employees performed a "citizens' arrest", and 
if your answer to No. 4 is "no", was there reason to believe that the notice will 
endanger the life or safety of the person making the arrest, or will likely enable the 
Plaintiff to escape; or at the time of the detention the Plaintiff was actually 
engaged in the commission of, or attempted commission of, a crime; or, the 
Plaintiff is being detained as a part of his pursuit immediately after the 
commission of a crime? 
Yes 
No 
n 
£ 
6. If you find tnat Plaintiff was detained, please state the dollar amount of damage, if 
any, Plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he suffered as a 
direct and proximate consequence of the detention. 
$51MD 
DATED this [l^ day of August, 2005. 
Foreperson 
A 
Tab 2 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-18 
Page 1 
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TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART II. ACTIONS, VENUE, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 
CHAPTER 11. ACTIONS - RIGHT TO SUE AND BE SUED 
GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-18 (2006) 
§ 78-11-18. Merchant's authority to detain 
Any merchant who has reason to believe that merchandise has been wrongfully taken by an individual contrary to 
Section 78-11-15 or 78-11-16 and that he can recover such merchandise by taking such individual into custody and 
detaining him may, for the purpose of attempting to effect such recovery or for the purpose of informing a peace officer 
of the circumstances of such detention, take the individual into custody and detain him in a reasonable manner and for a 
reasonable length of time. Such taking into custody and detention by a merchant or his employee shall not render such 
merchant or his employee criminally or civilly liable for false arrest, false imprisonment, slander or unlawful detention 
or for any other type of claim or action unless the custody and detention are unreasonable under all the circumstances. 
HISTORY: L. 1975, ch. 136, § 5; 1981, ch. 93, § 4. 
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STATE RULES 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
TITLE V GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Utah R App P Rule 24 (2006) 
Review Court Orders which may amend this Rule 
Rule 24 Briefs 
(a) Brief of the appellant The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate headings and in the order 
indicated 
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose judgment or order is sought to be 
reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties The list should be set 
out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover 
(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references 
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations, rules, statutes and other 
authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are cited 
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue the standard of appellate review with 
supporting authority, and 
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court, or 
(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court 
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose interpretation is determinative of 
the appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation If the pertinent 
part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the 
brief under paragraph (11) of this rule 
(7) A statement of the case The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of 
proceedings, and its disposition in the court below A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review 
shall follow All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record 
in accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule 
(8) Summary of arguments The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be a succmct condensation of 
the arguments actually made in the body of the brief It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under which the 
argument is arranged 
(9) An argument The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues 
presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, 
statutes, and parts of the record relied on A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that 
supports the challenged finding A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the request 
explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award 
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought 
Utah R App P Rule 24 
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(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under this paragraph The addendum 
shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick If the addendum is bound 
separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents The addendum shall contain a copy of 
(A) any constitulional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance cited in the brief but not 
reproduced verbatim in the brief, 
(B) in cases beirg reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals opinion, in all cases any court opinion of 
central importance tc the appeal but not available to the court as part of a regularly published leporter service, and 
(C) those parts c f the record on appeal that are of central importance to the determination of the appeal, such as the 
challenged instructions, findings of fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral 
decision, or the contract or document subject to construction 
(b) Brief of the appellee The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, 
except that the appellee need not include 
(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant, or 
(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the appellant The appellee may refer 
to the addendum of Ihe appellant 
(c) Reply brief The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the appellee has cross-
appealed, the appelhe may file a brief in reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-
appeal Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief The content of the 
reply brief shall conform to the requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule No further briefs may be 
filed except with leave of the appellate court 
(d) References m briefs to parties Counsel will be expected in their briefs and oral arguments to keep to a minimum 
references to parties by such designations as "appellant" and "appellee " It promotes clarity to use the designations used 
in the lower court O] in the agency proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the 
employee," "the injured person," "the taxpayer," etc 
(e) References in briefs to the record References shall be made to the pages of the original record as paginated 
pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared 
pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g) References to pages of published depositions oi transcripts shall identify the sequential 
number of the covei page of each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately 
numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by the transcriber References to exhibits 
shall be made to the exhibit numbers If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, 
reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was identified, offered, and received or 
rejected 
(f) Length of briefs Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs 
shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum 
containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by paragraph (a) of this rule In cases 
involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the length of briefs 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals If a cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a notice of appeal shall be 
deemed the appellant for the purposes of this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise 
orders The brief of the appellant shall not exceed 50 pages m length The brief of the appellee/cross-appellant shall 
contain the issues and arguments involved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of the appellant and shall 
not exceed 50 page s m length The appellant shall then file a brief which contains an answer to the original issues raised 
by the appellee/cross-appellant and a reply to the appellee's response to the issues raised in the appellant's opening brief 
The appellant's second brief shall not exceed 25 pages m length The appellee/cross-appellant may then file a second 
bnef, not to exceed 25 pages in length, which contains only a reply to the appellant's answer»to the original issues 
raised by the appellee/cross-appellant's first brief The lengths specified by this paragraph are exclusive of table of 
contents, table of authorities, and addenda 
(h) Permission for over length brief While such motions are disfavored, the court for good cause shown may upon 
motion permit a party to file a brief that exceeds the limitations of this rule The motion shall state with specificity the 
issues to be briefed, the number of additional pages requested, and the good cause for granting the motion A motion 
filed at least seven days before the date the brief is due or seeking five or fewer additional pages need not be 
Utah R App P Rule 24 
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accompanied by a copy of the brief A motion filed less than seven days before the date the brief is due and seeking 
more than 5 additional pages shall be accompanied by a copy of the draft brief for in camera inspection If the motion is 
granted, any responding party is entitled to an equal number of additional pages without further order of the court 
Whether the motion is granted or denied, the draft brief will be destroyed by the court 
(I) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees In cases involving more than one appellant or 
appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and 
any appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another Parties may similarly join in reply 
briefs 
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities When pertinent and significant authorities come to the attention of a party 
after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of 
the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme 
Court An original letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals There shall be a reference either to the 
page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the 
reasons for the supplemental citations Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited 
(k) Requirements and sanctions All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically 
arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters Briefs which are 
not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess 
attorney fees against the offending lawyer 
HISTORY: Amended effective October 1, 1992, July 1, 1994, April 1, 1995, April 1, 1998, November 1, 1999, April 
1, 2003, November 1, 2004, April 1, 2006 
NOTES: 
Advisory Committee Note ~ Rule 24 (a)(9) now reflects what Utah appellate courts have long held See In re 
Beesley, 883 P 2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994), Newmeyer v Newmeyer, 745 P 2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987) "To 
successfully appeal a trial court's findings of fact, appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate "[Attorneys] must 
extricate [themselves] from the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position In order to properly discharge 
the [marshalling] duty , the challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists '" ONEIDA/SLIC, v ONEIDA Cold 
Storage and Warehouse, Inc , 872 P 2d 1051, 1052-53 (Utah App 1994) (alteration in original) (quoting West Valley 
Cityv Majestic Inv Co ,818P2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App 1991)) See also State ex rel MS v Salata, 806 P 2d 1216, 
1218 (Utah App 1991), Bell v Elder, 782 P 2d 545, 547 (Utah App 1989), State v Moore, 802 P 2d 732, 738-39 
(Utah App 1990) 
The brief must contain for each issue raised on appeal, a statement of the applicable standard of review and citation 
of supporting authority 
Amendment Notes ~ The 2003 amendment deleted Subdivision (k) pertaining to brief covers 
The 2004 amendment added the last sentence in Subdivision (a)(9) 
The 2006 amendment substituted "this paragraph" for "this rule" in the last sentence in Subdivision (g), deleted 
"and may be exceeded only by permission of the court The court shall grant reasonable requests, for good cause shown" 
from the end of Subdivision (b), and added Subdivision (h), making related changes 
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STATE RULES 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
TITLE V. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Utah R App P Rule 33 (2006) 
Review Court Orders which may amend this Rule 
Rule 33 Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery of attorney's fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of right m a criminal case, if the court determines 
that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which 
may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The 
court may order that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one that is not 
grounded m fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse 
existing law An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed for any 
improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gam time that will benefit only 
the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper 
(c) Procedures. 
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its own motion. A party may request damages 
under this rule only as part of the appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of the appellee's 
brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other paper. 
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court shall issue to the party or the party's attorney 
or both an order to show cause why such damages should not be awarded. The order to show cause shall set forth the 
allegations which form the basis of the damages and permit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise 
ordered for good cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of oral argument. 
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the court shall grant a hearing. 
NOTES: 
Advisory Committee Note. ~ Rule 33 is substantially redrafted to provide definitions and procedures for assessing 
penalties for delays and frivolous appeals. 
If an appeal is found to be frivolous, the court must award damages This is in keeping with Rule 11 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the amount of damages — single or double costs or attorney fees or both — is left to 
the discretion of the court. Rule 33 is amended to make express the authority of the court to impose sanctions upon the 
party or upon counsel for the party. This rule does not apply to a first appeal of right in a criminal case to avoid the 
conflict created for appointed counsel by Anders v California, 386 US 738 (1967) and State v Clayton, 639 P 2d 168 
(Utah 1981) Under the law of these cases, appointed counsel must file an appeal and brief if requested by the 
defendant, and the court must find the appeal to be frivolous in order to dismiss the appeal. 
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STATE RULES 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
TITLE V. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Utah R App P Rule 34 (2006) 
Review Court Orders which may amend this Rule 
Rule 34. Award of costs 
(a) To whom allowed. Except as otherwise provided by law, if an appeal is dismissed, costs shall be taxed against the 
appellant unless otherwise agreed by the parties or ordered by the court; if a judgment or order is affirmed, costs shall be 
taxed against appellant unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or order is reversed, costs shall be taxed against the 
appellee unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or order is affirmed or reversed in part, or is vacated, costs shall be 
allowed as ordered by the court. Costs shall not be allowed or taxed in a criminal case. 
(b) Costs for and against the state of Utah. In cases involving the state of Utah or an agency or officer thereof, an 
award of costs for or against the state shall be at the discretion of the court unless specifically required or prohibited by 
law. 
(c) Costs of briefs and attachments, record, bonds and other expenses on appeal. The following may be taxed as 
costs in favor of the prevailing party in the appeal: the actual costs of a printed or typewritten brief or memoranda and 
attachments not to exceed $ 3.00 for each page, actual costs incurred in the preparation and transmission of the record, 
including costs of the reporter's transcript unless otherwise ordered by the court, premiums paid for supersedeas or cost 
bonds to preserve rights pending appeal, and the fees for filing and docketing the appeal. 
(d) Bill of costs taxed after remittitur. A party claiming costs shall, within 15 days after the remittitur is filed with 
the clerk of the trial court, serve upon the adverse party and file with the clerk of the trial court an itemized and verified 
bill of costs The adverse party may, within 5 days of service of the bill of costs, serve and file a notice of objection, 
together with a motion to have the costs taxed by the trial court. If there is no objection to the cost bill within the allotted 
time, the clerk of the trial court shall tax the costs as filed and enter judgment for the party entitled thereto, which 
judgment shall be entered in the judgment docket with the same force and effect as in the case of other judgments of 
record. If the cost bill of the prevailing party is timely opposed, the clerk, upon reasonable notice and hearing, shall tax 
the costs and enter a final determination and judgment which shall thereupon be entered m the judgment docket with the 
same force and effect as in the case of other judgments of record. The determination of the clerk shall be reviewable by 
the trial court upon the request of either party made within 5 days of the entry of the judgment. 
(e) Costs in other proceedings and agency appeals. In all other matters before the court, including appeals from an 
agency, costs may be allowed as m cases on appeal from a trial court. Within 15 days after the expiration of the time in 
which a petition for rehearing may be filed or withm 15 days after an order denying such a petition, the party to whom 
costs have been awarded may file with the clerk of the appellate court and serve upon the adverse party an itemized and 
verified bill of costs. The adverse party may, within 5 days after the service of the bill of costs file a notice of objection 
and a motion to have the costs taxed by the clerk. If no objection to the cost bill is filed withm the allotted time, the 
clerk shall thereupon tax the costs and enter judgment against the adverse party If the adverse party timely objects to 
the cost bill, the clerk, upon reasonable notice and hearing, shall determine and settle the costs, tax the same, and a 
judgment shall be entered thereon against the adverse party. The determination by the clerk shall be reviewable by the 
court upon the request of either party made withm 5 days of the entry of judgment; unless otherwise ordered, oral 
argument shall not be permitted A judgment under this section may be filed with the clerk of any district court in the 
Page 2 
Utah R App. P. Rule 34 
state, who shall docket a certified copy of the same in the manner and with the same force and effect as judgments of the 
district court. 
HISTORY: Amended effective November 1, 1999 
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STATE RULES 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
TITLE V. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Utah R App P Rule 40 (2006) 
Review Court Orders which may amend this Rule 
Rule 40 Attorney's or party's certificate, sanctions and discipline. 
(a) Attorney's or party's certificate. Every motion, brief, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be 
signed by at least one attorney of record who is an active member in good standing of the Bar of this state. The attorney 
shall sign his or her individual name and give his or her business address, telephone number, and Utah State Bar 
number. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign any motion, brief, or other paper and state the party's 
address and telephone number. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, motions, briefs, or other 
papers need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate 
that the attorney or party has read the motion, brief, or other paper; that to the best of his or her knowledge, information, 
and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, it is not frivolous or interposed for the purpose of delay as defined in Rule 
33 If a motion, brief, or other paper is not signed as required by this rule, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly 
after the omission is called to the attention of the attorney or party If a motion, brief, or other paper is signed in 
violation of this rule, the authority and the procedures of the court provided by Rule 33 shall apply. 
(b) Sanctions and discipline of attorneys and parties. The court may, after reasonable notice and an opportunity to 
show cause to the contrary, and upon hearing, if requested, take appropriate action against any attorney or person who 
practices before it for inadequate representation of a client, conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar or a person 
allowed to appear before the court, or for failure to comply with these rules or order of the court. Any action to suspend 
or disbar a member of the Utah State Bar shall be referred to the Office of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar. 
(c) Rule does not affect contempt power This rule shall not be construed to limit or impair the court's inherent and 
statutory contempt powers. 
(d) Appearance of counsel pro hac vice. An attorney who is licensed to practice before the bar of another state or a 
foreign country but who is not a member of the Bar of this state, may appear, pro hac vice upon motion, filed pursuant 
to the Code of Judicial Administration. A separate motion is not required m the appellate court if the attorney has 
previously been admitted pro hac vice in the lower tribunal, but the attorney shall file in the appellate court a notice of 
appearance pro hac vice to that effect. 
HISTORY: Amended effective November 1, 1999 
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STATE RULES 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
PART VII. JUDGMENT 
URCP Rule 54 (2006) 
Review Court Orders which may amend this Rule 
Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies. A 
judgment need not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. Judgments 
shall state whether they are entered upon trial, stipulation, motion or the court's initiative; and, unless otherwise directed 
by the court, a judgment shall not include any matter by reference. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When more than one claim for relief is 
presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple parties 
are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or 
parties only upon an express determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express 
direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order oi other form of 
decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the 
parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject 
to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the 
parties. 
(c) Demand for judgment. 
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant 
the relief to which the party m whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his 
pleadings It may be given for or against one or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case 
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or among themselves. 
(2) Judgment by default A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from, or exceed in amount, that 
specifically prayed for in the demand for judgment. 
(d) Costs. 
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made either m a statute of this state or in these 
rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however, 
where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such 
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, 
its officers and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. 
(2) How assessed The party who claims his costs must withm five days after the entry of judgment serve upon the 
adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary 
disbursements m the action, and file with the court a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's 
knowledge the items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred m the action or proceeding. 
A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs, file a 
motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court. 
URCP Rule 54 
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A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of or subsequent to the service and filing of 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as served 
and filed on the date judgment is entered 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment The clerk must include in any judgment signed by him any 
interest on the verdict or decision from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or 
ascertained. The clerk must, withm two days after the costs have been taxed or ascertained, in any case where not 
included in the judgment, insert the amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar 
notation thereof m the register of actions and in the judgment docket. 
HISTORY: Amended effective January 1, 1985, November 1, 2003 
